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Abstract 
This essay joins Wilhelm Dilthey’s conception of the metaphysical impulse as a flight 
from the tragedy of human finitude with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s understanding of how 
language bewitches intelligence. We contend that there are features of the 
phenomenology of language that play a constitutive and pervasive role in the 
formation of metaphysical illusion. 
 
Introduction 
 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our  
language.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, section 109 
 
Soon after beginning work on a project on the phenomenology of language, we came 
upon Andrew Inkpin’s (2016) recent book, Disclosing the World: On the 
Phenomenology of Language. The title of the book alone left us wondering whether 
there is anything remaining for us to illuminate. Indeed there is. Drawing on the works 
of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein, Inkpin presents an elegant and 
comprehensive account of how the experience of language and its principles of 
organization play a constitutive, usually prereflective role in disclosing and opening up 
the world. He does not, however, pay systematic attention to how the experience of 
language, in Wittgenstein’s (1953) words, bewitches intelligence by playing a 
constitutive role in the formation of metaphysical illusion—the subject matter of this 
essay. 
 
Wittgenstein’s account of how language bewitches one’s intelligence is a singular 
achievement in the phenomenology of language. In section 426 of Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein famously claims that the meaning of a word is to be found 
in the “actual use” of it, and he contrasts this understanding with the projection of a 
picture: 
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   A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual         
use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. 
         …. [T]he form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who 
             knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series 
                and he sees into human consciousness. (Wittgenstein, 1953, section 426)  
 
Wittgenstein is claiming here that when one projects a picture as the meaning of a 
word, it gives one the illusion of a God’s-eye view of the word’s referent as a thing-in-
itself, an illusory clarity that one much prefers over the “muddied” view given in the 
understanding that the actual meaning of a word is to be found in its multiple and 
shifting contexts of use. When the illusory picture is then imagined as ultimately real, 
the word has become transformed into a metaphysical entity. In place of the 
“muddied” view given by contexts of use—finite, contingent, unstable, transient—one 
can imagine the clear outlines of an everlasting entity. Metaphysical illusion, mediated 
by reified pictures, replaces the finitude and transience of existence with a God’s-eye 
view of an irreducibly absolute and eternally changeless reality (Stolorow & Atwood, 
2013). A bewitchment of intelligence by language is thereby accomplished! 
 
In what follows, we seek to expand Wittgenstein’s analysis of bewitchment of 
intelligence by language into a broader account of how one’s prereflective experience 
of language shapes one’s sense of the real. 
 
The Illusion of Spatial Location 
A good example, also discussed by Wittgenstein, is the use of words that properly 
describe geometric space to “locate” emotional experience. People speak of their 
inner experiences, their inner feelings, getting their anger (from the inside) out, taking 
things in, looking inward (introspection), etc. These expressions correspond to 
Descartes’s picture of the mind as a thinking thing that has an inside with contents and 
that looks out upon an external world from which it is separated. The picture of the 
mind as an entity located in Cartesian space—a picture institutionalized in the 
experience of everyday language—reifies what Zahavi (2005) calls experiential 
selfhood, the “mineness” of one’s experiences. Such a picture prereflectively 
transforms the vulnerable, context-dependent, and evanescent experience of mineness 
into the stability and clarity of geometric space. 
 
The Illusion of Perceptible Essences 
Another example discussed by Wittgenstein is found in the use of a single word to 
denote an array of items that bear a “family resemblance” to one another—i.e., items 
that share some qualities but not others. When such items are grouped together under 
one word, a reified picture is created of an essence that each of them instantiates. 
Psychiatry’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, for example, will present several 
symptoms that are claimed to be characteristic of a diagnostic entity, say depression, 
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and a patient is said to be afflicted with this disorder if a certain proportion of those 
symptoms are manifest. That is, people whose sufferings bear a family resemblance to 
one another become, through the reified picture that has been named, instantiations of 
a metaphysical diagnostic essence, an essence that can somehow be directly perceived 
through some form of “eidetic intuition” (Husserl, 1913/2001). 
 
The Illusion of Transparency 
Consider again, briefly, the word mind, a term showing a great many meanings, 
depending on its particular contexts of use. In one of these, a picture commonly 
visualized is of an entity having external boundaries and an interior with contents. As 
noted earlier, the spatial interiority of such a picture reifies and absolutizes the 
subjective sense of “minenesss”, metaphysicalizing the experience of one’s 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings being one’s own. When one thinks of oneself and 
others as possessing minds, something that may seem to be as incontrovertible as the 
proposition that the sun rises in the morning, experiential lives acquire a dimension of 
“inwardness” separating the experiencing subject from “outer” reality. In actual 
language use, the pictures accompanying the use of this word fluctuate, in a kind of 
dance of variations in which what is denoted and connoted, visualized and absolutized, 
shifts from moment to moment in synchrony with changes in its context.  
 
Imagining the meaning of the term mind to coincide fully with its associated picture, 
one may also presuppose that this meaning is shared by others. The use of the word in 
conversation is accordingly regarded as transparent to the other, who is presumed to 
live in a common world and to be in contact with exactly that of which one speaks. 
But how can one know that the meaning of this term, and really of any word one uses, 
is the same for the other as it is for oneself? 
 
Perhaps the illusion of transparency, of absolute equivalency of meaning, serves as an 
antidote to a painful sense of isolation accompanying the finitude of intersubjective 
relatedness. One person can never know with absolute certainty the experience of the 
other, the only possibility being a succession of ever-closer approximations. Could it 
be that by embracing universalized pictures of the meanings of the words one uses and 
diverting one’s gaze from all the deficiencies and ambiguities in mutual 
understanding, one is shielded from an otherwise unbearable feeling of being alone? 
 
The Tragic and the Metaphysical 
The first Western philosopher to examine systematically the relationship between the 
tragedy of human finitude and the ubiquity of metaphysical illusion was Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1910/2002). As is elegantly reconstructed by de Mul (2004), Dilthey’s life’s 
work can be seen as an effort to replace the Kantian a priori—the timeless forms of 
perception and categories of cognition through which the world becomes intelligible to 
us—with “life categories” that are historically contingent and constituted over the 
course of a living historical process. There is a tragic dimension to Dilthey’s historical 
consciousness, in that it brings out the “tragic contradiction between the philosophical 
desire for universal validity [the metaphysical impulse] and the realization of the 
fundamental finitude of every attempt to satisfy that desire” (de Mul, 2004, p. 154). 
Dilthey’s recognition of this tragic contradiction leads him to elaborate a hermeneutic 
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phenomenology of metaphysics. Dilthey’s historical reconstruction of the 
development of metaphysics aims at no less than its “euthanasia”. Although he holds 
that metaphysical desire is inherent to human nature, what he seeks to unmask are the 
illusions that this ubiquitous desire creates. Metaphysical illusion, according to 
Dilthey, transforms historically contingent nexuses of intelligibility—worldviews, as 
he eventually calls them—into timeless forms of reality. Anticipating Heidegger 
(1927/1962), Dilthey holds that every worldview is grounded in a mood regarding the 
tragic realization of the finitude of life. The metaphysicalization of worldviews 
transforms the unbearable fragility and transience of all things human into an 
enduring, permanent, changeless reality, an illusory world of eternal truths. Dilthey 
grasps the metaphysical impulse as a relentless tendency to transform the experience 
of the real—how entities are intelligible to us—into a reified vision of the REALLY 
real. In this essay we have contended that a certain feature of the phenomenology of 
language—the prereflective presumption that words refer to pictures and that the 
pictures depict metaphysical entities—plays a constitutive role in such illusory 
transformations. 
 
Metaphysical Illusion in Everyday Life 
An understanding of the reified pictures that are associated with the words one uses 
leads to the idea that people generally are metaphysicians. Assuming that the words 
that are spoken have fixed, universally transparent meanings, one is lulled away from 
an anxious appreciation of the contingent, ever-shifting nature of intersubjective life. 
What are the interrelated dimensions of experience that are engaged in this 
metaphysicalization of everyday existence? 
 
 One of these is that of solidity—the sense of the tangible, of the physical, of the dense 
and heavy. If one’s words have no fixed and absolute meanings, the very foundations 
on which one stands threaten to dissolve into thin air. 
 
A second dimension is one of continuity, an experience of the sameness over time of 
the various things of which one speaks. The pictures evoked by the words that are 
used are of entities showing a reassuring stability from each moment to the next, 
offering protection against a descent into temporal chaos. 
 
Still another dimension is that of coherence. The pictures that one assumes capture the 
meanings of what is said are of wholes, of parts that form a unity or identity that is felt 
to exist in its own right. Stripped of such coherence, all the things of one’s world, 
including other people and one’s own very selfhood, collapse into an unbearable 
indeterminacy. 
 
What would happen to the human experience of language and communication if the 
reified pictures one imagines as the meanings of the words that are spoken, 
transparently available to all, vanished and were replaced by an ongoing sense of those 
words’ fluidity as they are used in varying contexts? What if the felt certainties 
accompanying our verbal exchanges with one another melted into an ever-changing 
incoherence and insolidity? By metaphysicalizing the words and meanings of 
everyday discourse, human beings confer a calming order on their experiences of life 
and the language used symbolically to represent them. The very same linguistic 
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capacities that make possible the disclosure of human finitude also provide the means 
by which the tragedy of finitude is evaded. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Most often the term finitude is used to denote temporal limitedness—mortality. But 
the term can be seen to encompass all the ways in which finite human existing is 
limited, and each can be a source of traumatic emotion (Stolorow, 2007). For example, 
as we have noted, there is also the impossibility of clear and certain knowing and the 
corresponding finitude of intersubjective relatedness. Human beings must navigate 
these multiple dimensions of finitude, and they do so by creating a multitude of 
countervailing metaphysical illusions that serve to evade or counteract the 
corresponding traumatic affect. Far from being distinguished by being an animal 
rationale, the human being, as Dilthey recognized, is a being who cannot exist without 
metaphysical illusion, and such illusion, as Wittgenstein understood, is made possible 
by the phenomenology of language. Unlike Dilthey, who largely reserved the 
metaphysical impulse to abstract philosophical systems, we have extended it to 
everyday life as well. And unlike Wittgenstein, who believed that the bewitchment of 
intelligence by language could be overcome by good philosophizing, we contend that 
such bewitchment is an indelible feature of the never-ending struggle against the 
tragedy of finitude. 
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